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APPKT.T.AKFT ' fi REPLY BRIEF

Appellant, Julie Turner ("Turner"), respectfully submits this
Brief in reply to the brief of Appellee Amy Nelson ("Nelson").
INTRODUCTION
Utah's comparative negligence statute is unique among its
counterparts in sister states.

While it retains many of the

theoretical underpinnings of sister statutes, it applies them in a
more reasoned and even-handed manner to negligence actions in Utah.
Utah was by far the last of the Pacific region states to enact
a comparative negligence statute. As such, it enjoyed the benefits
of

other

states'

successes

and

failures, and

was

able

to

incorporate the wisdom of other states' judicial interpretations
into its comparative negligence scheme.
This scheme, codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 - 43,
embodies the Utah Legislature's considered decision to restrict the
apportionment of negligence to parties to the action.

Underlying

this decision are several important policy considerations.
The first, and foremost, consideration is fairness to all
parties to the litigation.

By restricting the apportionment of

negligence to parties, the statute encourages the joinder of all
potentially responsible tortfeasors into the initial litigation,
which in turn ensures that no defendant will be liable for more
than her share of fault.
The statute encourages joinder by allocating the burden of
joining ^t responsible defendant

to the party wishing to apportion

negligence. This in turn ensures that all responsible parties will
be present to protect their interests, and further ensures that
fault will be allocated realistically and fairly in an

adversarial

proceeding.

Defendants are thus protected from paying more than

their proportionate share of liability and Plaintiffs are protected
from the inequity of a disproportionate and unenforceable judgment
against an "empty chair."
The statute also promotes judicial economy.

By encouraging

joinder of all potentially responsible parties in the initial
litigation, it prevents multiple and successive litigation by
plaintiffs seeking to bind "ghost" tortfeasors legally for acts for
which a jury may find them theoretically responsible.
Utah's comparative negligence statute represents a unique
legislative balancing of competing policy objectives.

It is the

duty of this Court to protect and preserve that balance.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ADDITION OF THE NON-PARTY CITY TO THE
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM THE DAY OF TRIAL WAS ERROR
A.

Turner's Objection is not Moot

Nelson's first argument is that Turner's objection to the
addition of the non-party City to the verdict form the day of trial
is "moot" because Nelson was found to have no negligence by the
jury.

Nelson's argument is circular and without merit.

The doctrine of "mootness" requires that an actual controversy
exist at all stages of appellate review, and not simply on the date
the action is initiated. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct.
705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).

A justiciable controversy clearly

exists between Turner and Nelson, arising from Nelson's collision
with Turner after running a stop sign on July 6, 1989, which is
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capable of review and decision by this Court.

Turner's claim

plainly is not "moot."
Nelson's claim that the addition of the non-party City the day
of trial was of "no consequence" is disingenuous at best and
similarly meritless.

"Even if Salt Lake City had not been on the

verdict form, defendant would have made the same argument, claiming
that she was free of fault because the stop sign could not be
seen." Nelson's Brief, at 12.

Nelson's opening statement to the

jury, however, impugns this assertion:
I think the real fault here that —
Salt Lake City.
It's a bad design.
signed.
(R. 376)(emphasis added).

we're suggesting is with
They didn't have it well

Nelson argued that the City's negligent

design, not her own alleged freedom from negligence, was the cause
of the accident.

It is difficult to imagine the same argument

being made if the City were not on the verdict form.
The

trial

transcript

clearly

demonstrates

that

Nelson's

primary defense was the alleged negligence of the "empty chair"
City, not her alleged "freedom from negligence."

Nelson's claim

that the addition of the City "was of no consequence" is clearly
without merit.
Nelson's reliance upon Beitzel v. City of Coeur d' Alene, 827
P. 2d 1160 (Idaho 1992), is misplaced.

In Beitzel, the Idaho

Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal to include unnamed
non-parties on the verdict form.

The court held that because the

jury had found the plaintiff not to be negligent, any non-party
negligence would not serve to reduce the plaintiff's recovery
because

Idaho's

comparative

negligence
-3-

statutes

require

apportionment only when there negligence attributable to the person
recovering. Id. at 1164 (emphasis added).
Beitzel is thus inapplicable because

(1) the jury never

reached the question of Turner's negligence, if any; and (2)
Idaho's comparative negligence scheme operates differently than
Utah's.

Beitzel further does not apply by analogy, because

comparative

negligence

statutes

do

not

treat

plaintiffs

and

defendants similarly.
The court's opinion in Beitzel is, however, instructive.

It

clearly demonstrates that even Idaho, the jurisdiction upon which
Nelson relies so heavily for support, recognizes that non-parties
may be excluded

from negligence

apportionment

in appropriate

circumstances. Ld.; Hickman v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 758 P.2d
704 (Idaho 1988).

The Beitzel court also recognizes the policies

of fairness to plaintiffs ("any negligence of the non-party could
not

serve

to

lessen

the

award

to

the

plaintiffs")

and

of

encouraging joinder of non-parties to the action ("[t]he verdict
would not have been binding on the unnamed [non]party, in any
event."). Id. at 1164-65.
The trial court's inclusion of the non-party City on the
verdict form and as a "party" at trial clearly and conclusively
altered the posture and presentation of the case below.

It

permitted the jury to assign all liability to an unrepresented
"ghost" party, a party the jury knew could not and would not be
bound by its verdict.

Without the City present to protect its

interests and to provide a truly adversarial atmosphere, Nelson was
permitted to foist her liability upon an absent, unrepresented
-4-

party, thus denying Turner a fair trial. The court's decision was
prejudicial and clearly erroneous and should be reversed.
B.

Utah's Comparative Negligence Statute Cannot Be Construed
Without Reference to S 78-27-41

Both parties agree that the interpretation of § 78-27-41 is
the key to this appeal.

Section 78-27-41 provides:

A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to
the litigation, may join as parties
any defendants
who may
have caused or contributed
to the injury or damage for which
recovery is sought, for the purpose of having determined
their
respective
of
fault.
Id. § 78-27-41 (emphasis supplied). Nelson argues that § 78-27-41
represents merely a "strategic option" to be employed by litigants
when, and if, it serves their purposes. Nelson's Brief, at 14-15.
Turner, conversely, asserts that § 78-27-41 represents an integral
component of the comparative negligence scheme enacted by the Utah
Legislature that requires joinder of a defendant

as a prerequisite

to apportionment of her alleged negligence.
Utah's well-settled rules of statutory construction clearly
support the latter position. When construing a statute, all words
are presumed to have been used advisedly by the legislature, and
the construction of a statute which gives effect to all of its
provisions is favored. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428
(Utah 1989); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988)(emphasis
added) .

Further, statutes in Utah are not to be severed and

considered piecemeal, but must be given effect in their

entirety

whenever possible. Peay v. Board of Education of Provo City School
Dist.. 377 P.2d 490 (Utah 1962)(emphasis supplied).
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Nelson's interpretation
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ipportionment

Am 1 < , it.houi, compromising

i he

legislative balance struck between considerations of tort reform,
fairness to litigants and judicial economy.
Nelson focuses upon the use of the word "may" in § 78-27-41,
and argues that it makes joinder optional.

As this Court has

previously held, however, use of a traditionally permissive word in
a statute does not automatically render it permissive within the
context of the statute:
There is no universal rule by which directory provisions may,
under all circumstances, be distinguished from those which are
mandatory. The intention of the legislature, however, should
be controlling and no formalistic
rule of grammar or word form
should stand in the way of carrying
out the
legislative
intent.
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah
1978)(citing 1A Sutherland

Statutory

300 (4th Ed.)) (emphasis added).

Construction

In the context of the Act, joinder

under § 78-27-41 is only mandatory when a party
non-party's

negligence

§ 25.03, at 299-

apportioned.

seeks

to have

a

The Legislature's use of the

word "may" in § 78-27-41 thus embodies both a directory and a
mandatory connotation.
Nelson also argues that non-parties*

negligence must be

permitted to be apportioned in order to maintain the "purity" of
the comparative negligence scheme.

Several sister states have

considered, and expressly rejected, this argument on a variety of
grounds. See Mills v. Brown, 735 P.2d 603 (Ore. 1987); Warmbrodt v.
Blanchard,

692 P.2d

1282

(Nev. 1984); National Farmers Union

Property & Casualty Co. v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Colo.
1983)(En

Banc).
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Supreme Court stated:

Nelson's reliance upon Oklahoma case law for support is
misplaced, since Oklahoma retains joint and several
liability as a feature of its comparative negligence scheme.
£•<?•# Anderson v. O'Donoahue, 677 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1983),
-8-

[A] comparison of the negligence of absent tortfeasors may
work to defeat any recovery by a deserving plaintiff . • . the
plaintiff's claim against tortfeasors named as defendants
should not be compromised in cases where the identity of an
absent tortfeasors [sic] is unknown, such as the "phantom" in
a three car hit-and-run accident. By requiring the jury to
apportion 100 percent of the negligence among the parties, the
burden of persuading the factfinder to resolve the comparative
negligence equation is shared equally between the plaintiffs
and the tortfeasors who participate in the trial.
*

*

*

*

*

[I]t is preferable to place the burden of finding and suing
absent tortfeasors on those who caused plaintiff to suffer
damages.
National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Frackeltonf 662
P.2d 1056, 1060 (Colo. 1983).
In § 78-27-41 the Utah Legislature has chosen to allocate the
burden of finding and suing absent tortfeasors upon the party
wishing to apportion those tortfeasors' negligence.

This Court

should enforce the Legislature's choice by giving effect to § 7827-41 and reversing and remanding the trial court's decision below.
C.

The Addition of the Non-Party City the Day of Trial Was
Manifestly Prejudicial

In her Brief, Nelson asserts that Turner was not prejudiced by
the addition of the non-party City the day of trial. In support of
this assertion, Nelson argues that she claimed all along that the
stop sign in question was partially obstructed and "not properly
visible." Nelson further claims that the presence of the City did
not alter the nature, presentation or outcome of the case.
Turner was prejudiced

in three

addition of the non-party City:

fundamental ways by the

(1) She was given inadequate

notice and opportunity to prepare for the addition of a new party
and new issues to the litigation; (2) She was improperly forced at
-9-

t r i a l I""1",!" pii«','l "';j d n e y a f ; i v*> ( i" l' n < ' i" "j, ' nnn -n^ql ijenee ) ; and (3) She
was denied recovery for her Injuries.
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1190 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(Proper standard for *

considering

t

i
judge
I i

be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for
I ii

which he had not time to prepare") . Similarly, in Tripp v. Vaughn.
746 P.2d 795 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals affirmed
the denial of a motion to add a third party defendant made two
weeks before trial where "inadequate reasons for the untimely
motion were presented . . . ." Id. at 7 98.
Nelson has wholly failed to present an adequate reason for the
timing of her motion to add the City.

Nelson alone knew that the

City was a proper party to the lawsuit from the day she was served.
Her answer to Turner's complaint alleges that Turner's injuries
were "caused by the negligence of third parties."

Nelson never

identified a third party, however, until six (6) days before trial.
Nelson clearly made a conscious "strategic" decision to "lay
behind the log" until the week of trial before naming the City as
a potentially responsible party. This was an admirably clever bit
of lawyering on Nelson's part in the grand tradition of the Perry
Mason "surprise witness."

It proved to be remarkably successful.

Trial by ambush, however, was abolished in 1937 with the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 1 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that the rules "shall be
liberally construed to secure the lust, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action." Utah R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added).
This Court has consistently required that the addition of parties
shortly before or at trial be fair to the opposing party. Girard v.
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983).

The addition of the City the

day of trial was neither fair to Turner nor just, and was clearly
prejudicial.

The trial court's decision should be reversed.
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2.

Proving the Negative

By allowing the City to be added to the verdict form, the
trial court improperly put Turner in the position of having to
prove a negative, i.e.f the City's non-negligence, in order to
recover for her injuries.
burden of proof.

In effect the trial court shifted the

As the Colorado Supreme Court stated, "it is

unfair to saddle the plaintiff with the burden of litigating
liability issues of a non-party or to try the absent tortfeasor in
absentia

under conditions which could not bind that person under

principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel." Frackelton, 662
P.2d at 1060.
3.

Denial of Recovery

The greatest prejudice caused by the addition of the non-party
City the day of trial was the denial of any recovery by plaintiff
for her injuries.

By shifting the focus from her own actions to

the City's alleged negligent design or signing of the intersection,
Nelson escaped liability for Turner's injuries, injuries which
Nelson indisputably caused.

This result could not have been

reached under the facts of this case but for the presence of the
City both on the verdict form and as an "empty chair" at trial.
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this precise result under
principles of equity and fairness to the plaintiff:
[A] comparison of the negligence of absent tortfeasors may
work to defeat any recovery by a deserving plaintiff . . . the
plaintiff's claim against tortfeasors named as defendants
should not be compromised . . . By requiring the jury to
apportion 100 percent of the negligence among the parties, the
burden of persuading the factfinder to resolve the comparative
negligence equation is shared equally between the plaintiffs
and the tortfeasors who participate in the trial.

-12-

Id.
The jury's verdict is probably the best evidence of the
prejudice caused by the addition of the City the day of trial.
Nelson would seemingly have the Court believe that it was the City,
not Nelson, who ran the stop sign and broadsided Turner.

Had the

court properly refused to add the City, the jury would have
apportioned

fault solely between Turner and Nelson.

It is

indisputable that, under the facts presented at trial, Nelson would
have borne a substantial percentage, if not the entirety, of the
liability for Turner's damages.

The prejudice to Turner is clear

and unequivocal.
Because the jury below was prevented from reaching the issue
of whether Turner was in any way negligent, the Court should
reverse the trial court and grant Turner a new trial in which the
jury can apportion negligence between the plaintiff

and the

tortfeasor who participated in the trial, Turner and Nelson.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT REBUTTAL TESTIMONY WAS
PREJUDICIAL ERROR
Nelson's reliance upon the principle of "surprise" as a ground

for refusing Turner's proffered rebuttal evidence is indeed curious
and ironic.

The pot has called the proverbial kettle "black."

Contrary to Nelson's assertions, Turner was not required in
her case in chief to prove that the stop sign was "unobstructed."
Turner was required to prove that Nelson ran a stop sign, and that
Nelson's negligence was the proximate cause of Turner's injuries.
In Rodriguez v. Olin Corp., 780 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1986) , the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that a plaintiff only bears

-13-

the burden of proving a prima facie

case, and is not required to

"prove the negative" of defendant's facts or theories:
This rule proceeds from the view that a plaintiff has the
right to adduce whatever evidence is necessary to establish
its prima facie case and is under no obligation to anticipate
and negate in its own case in chief any facts or theories that
may be raised on defense.
Id.; accord,

Kaczmarek v. Allied Chemical Corp., 836 F.2d 1055 (7th

Cir. 1987); Soliz v. Ammerman, 395 P.2d 25 (Utah 1964)(Rebuttal
evidence

is designed to meet

facts not raised prior to the

defendant's case in chief, not facts which could have been raised).
In its decision, the court discussed the rules and considerations
governing the admission or denial of rebuttal testimony. The court
held that rebuttal evidence should be allowed where "new" testimony
is presented during defendant's case in chief.

The court stated

that
Logic and fairness lead us to conclude that new evidence for
purposes of rebuttal does not mean "brand new."
Rather,
evidence is new if, under all the facts and circumstances, the
court concludes that the evidence was not fairly and
adequately presented to the trier of fact before the
defendant's case in chief.
Id. at 496.
Witness Nakling's proffered testimony was clearly proper
rebuttal

evidence that should have been admitted by the trial

court.

It was offered to refute Nelson's testimony that the stop

sign was obstructed, and to controvert the testimony of Nelson's
expert, who testified that, due to the obstruction, Nelson could
not reasonably have been aware that she needed to stop. Nelson and
her expert's testimony was unquestionably "new" evidence which
Turner was under no obligation to anticipate and negate in her case

-14-

in chief. Rodriguez, 780 F.2d at 496.

The fact that Nakling was

not included on pretrial Turner's witness list is irrelevant in the
context of rebuttal.
Moreover, it is undisputed that the substance o£ Nakling's
testimony had not adequately been presented to the jury prior to
Nelson's case in chief. See id.; see also

Everett v. S.H. Parks &

Associates, Inc., 697 F.2d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1983)(plaintiff's
rebuttal

evidence

"was not

truly

relevant until

[defendant]

presented its defense").

Turner was thus effectively prevented

from offering any evidence

that the sign was not obstructed.

The

trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Nakling from
testifying.
Finally, Nelson states in her Brief that
The Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted in Utah and most
states of the United States are intended to provide each party
with full access to the other's case to avoid surprises at
trial.
To allow one side to use a witness that was not
revealed . . . jeopardizes the other party's trial preparation
and should not be permitted.
Nelson's Brief, at 24. We could not have said it better. Had both
parties to this appeal been accorded the fairness embodied in this
paragraph, this case would not be before the Court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in
Turner's Brief in Chief, Turner respectfully requests that the
Court reverse and remand this case with instructions to grant
Turner a new trial as to all issues.
Respectfully submitted,
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